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1. Introduction
"Uniform monetary policy and inflexible exchange rates will create conflicts when-
ever cyclical conditions differ among the member countries." Martin Feldstein
(1997)
The crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU) brought a sharp economic di-
vision between core and peripheral members states to the limelight (European Com-
mission, 2014). Whereas core countries such as Germany had experienced only
temporary losses in output, peripheral countries such as Greece or Portugal con-
tinue to fight with weak economic activity and a stark rise in unemployment.
Analyzing and assessing cross-country heterogeneity among EMU members play
a key role for establishing a sustainable governance for the euro area. Hence, the
core-periphery paradigma has been subject of much academic work (Blanchard
et al., 2015; Wortmann and Stahl, 2016; Cesaroni and De Santis, 2016).
The core-periphery distinction is especially relevant for monetary policy. Di-
verging economic trajectories pose a significant threat to the stability of the EMU,
since the European Central Bank (ECB) can only react with a "one-size-fits-all"
interest rate policy to stabilize output movements. The importance of synchro-
nized business cycles for a well-functioning currency union is stressed in the theory
of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA), pioneered by the work of Mundell (1961)
and McKinnon (1963).1 Firstly, the more aligned the business cycles of members of
a monetary union are, the easier it is for the central bank to conduct stabilization
policies (Clarida et al., 1999; Rogoff, 1985). Secondly, a high degree of synchro-
nization between national cycles may reduce the probability of asymmetric shock
propagation across EMU members (Altavilla, 2004).
In a string of papers, Eichengreen (1990, 1991, 1993) concludes that the cost of
giving up autonomy over monetary policy is especially high if business cycles of
member states are only weakly correlated and alternative adjustment mechanisms,
such as factor mobility, are not sufficiently available. To put it differently: the
higher the synchronization of business cycles among member states is, the lower
1See Mongelli (2008) for a theory on the evolution of the OCA idea.
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is the cost of abandoning national monetary policy. As a result, business cycle
synchronization is considered to be the most important OCA criterion (Gächter
et al., 2012).
Based on this reasoning, our paper adds to the vast literature on business cycle
synchronization by providing a thorough analysis of how output co-moves among
EMU member states. Specifically, we complement the literature by focusing on
the relationship between two clusters within the EMU: a group of core countries,
namely Germany, France, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, and a group of pe-
ripheral countries, i.e. Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain.2 Several studies
pointed to a division of core and peripheral countries even before the introduction
of the Euro (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992; Dickerson et al., 1998).3 Lehwald
(2013) concludes that business cycles for core and peripheral countries diverged
after the introduction of the EMU, in line with Papageorgiou et al. (2010). Our
main research questions are: what are the correlation patterns between the core
and the periphery in the EMU, and how has the co-movement of output evolved
over time, especially in the crisis period starting in 2007?
The bulk of earlier studies that examined business cycle synchronization relies
either on calculating a correlation measure over the entire time period or over non-
overlapping subperiods of time (Furceri and Karras, 2008; Gouveia and Correia,
2008). The observed time window is often set arbitrarily and the correlation coef-
ficients are prone to potential outliers biasing the results. We are able to overcome
these problems by using a correlation index pioneered by Cerqueira and Martins
(2009) that provides us with a correlation measure on a quarterly basis. In our
empirical analysis, we start with a comparison of simple correlation coefficients,
but continue with both parametric and nonparametric estimations in the spirit of
2There exists no exact definition as to which countries belong to the core or to the periphery.
With regards to the latter, the literature nearly unanimously includes Portugal, Spain, Ireland
and Greece, with Italy being sometimes excluded (Lehwald, 2013). For the former, we follow
a geographical definition and include France in the group of core countries, as opposed to
studies clustering along country-specific economic policies (Schäfer, 2016).
3The distinction between a core and a peripheral set of countries was also found for the other
criteria suggested by the OCA theory, see Artis (2003). As Artis and Zhang (2002) point
out, there exists a group of Southern peripheral countries, namely Spain, Italy, Portugal, and
Greece, for which participating in a currency union would not be strongly advised.
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Cerqueira (2013) to detect a potential change in the cross-country core-periphery
pattern. While the former are standard and widely used in economics, the nonpara-
metric measures in form of local polynomial regressions (LPR) have the advantage
that they are very flexible in their use and do not rely on prior assumptions about a
particular functional form regarding the co-movement of economic activity. Thus,
our quarterly correlation index and the LPR framework permit us to specifically
track the changing relationship over time. Since our empirical investigation covers
the time period from 1970Q1 to 2015Q4, we are able to investigate the poten-
tial (de)synchronizing effects of both the great financial crisis and the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis, an issue that only a limited number of studies have addressed
so far (Grigoraş and Stanciu, 2016; Degiannakis et al., 2014). Apart from the syn-
chronization of business cycles, we also study their amplitudes because different
amplitudes can lead to diverging cyclical conditions even if the cycles are perfectly
correlated.
These aspects relate to the future of the economic governance of the EMU, since
the negative effects of strongly diverging business cycles could be minimized by
common institutions for risk sharing. De Grauwe and Ji (2016), for instance, ar-
gue that risk-sharing efforts to stabilize the business cycles should be strengthened
relative to the efforts that have been taken to conduct structural reforms. This
is because they show empirically that a large part of the divergence in the Euro-
zone was the result of business cycle movements whose amplitudes differ across
countries.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows: both our panel and
LPR estimations suggest that the output co-movement between core and periph-
eral countries decreased markedly in the wake of the financial crisis. Analyzing
the synchronization between core and peripheral economies among themselves,
our results point to a rather stark drift among peripheral countries around the
financial crisis, which was partly reversed during the sovereign debt crisis. Core
economies, on the other hand, enjoyed a rising synchronization of output during
both the financial and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. We observe the same
pattern when comparing the alignment of economic activity of our two clusters
with countries outside of the EMU: the drop in synchronization is significantly
3
more pronounced for countries belonging to the periphery than to the core. We
also find that there are large differences in the amplitudes of national cycles, which
seem to be related to the extent to which national economies react to the common
cycle. But these differences are not systematically related to the core-periphery di-
vergence in correlations. This suggests that the core-periphery desynchronization
is not the only problem for the euro area.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview
of the related literature, Section 3 discusses our data, Section 4 describes our
empirical methods and the estimation results, while Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
The debate about whether and how business cycles are synchronizing in the EMU
has been the focus of an intense academic exchange. In this section, we will give a
short and necessarily selective review of the vast literature relevant in our context.4
Before the start of the EMU, several studies examined whether the economies
that planned to form a common currency area in Europe could be considered an
optimum currency area. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) use structural vector
autoregressions (SVAR) to identify the incidence of supply and demand shocks
in Europe. Both types of shocks are estimated to be smaller in magnitude and
more intercorrelated for a group of core countries, consisting of Germany, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark - than for the other European Community
(EC) countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and the UK. Over-
all, "there is also little evidence of convergence in the sense of the core-periphery
distinction becoming less pronounced over time" (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992,
p. 34). In the same vein, Dickerson et al. (1998) find a clear difference in business
cycles between a group of core countries (Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxem-
4While we focus on studies that investigate business cycle synchronization at the national level,
another strand of the literature focus on co-movement between regions in the EU. See, for
instance, Anagnostou et al. (2015), Bierbaumer-Polly et al. (2016) or Belke and Heine (2006).
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bourg, Germany) and the periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Denmark,
United Kingdom, Spain) prior to the implementation of the EMU.
Christodoulakis et al. (1995) tend to have a more optimistic view. According to
their empirical framework, countries of the EC react remarkably similar to shocks,
even though the nature of the shocks might be rather different. Mostly, these
differences were found to be related to institutions (e.g. labour market regulations)
or policy variables (such as government consumption). As a result, "observed
differences in shocks and business cycles mechanisms will tend to melt down as
common institutions and politics start to emerge" (Christodoulakis et al., 1995, p.
16), a view shared by the European Commission (1990) in its seminal study One
Market, One Money. Moreover, they do not find any evidence for a core-periphery
distinction. Others point to the increase of business cycle synchronization in the
run-up to the EMU (Angeloni and Dedola, 1999; Fatas, 1997).
Would the introduction of the Euro spur business cycle synchronization among
member states? Proponents of the endogeneous OCA analysis, based on the sem-
inal papers of Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), tended to agree. They argued that
differences in the co-movement of aggregate output between future members of the
EMU were not as problematic as initially claimed, since member states would meet
the necessary OCA criteria better after the introduction of the common currency,
i.e. ex post than ex ante. Following this logic, the introduction of the EMU would
have led to a marked increase in economic and financial integration that would
consequently help to align economic fluctuations among member states. With
the benefit of hindsight, the empirical evidence is conflicting, making the notion
of whether the introduction of EMU led to higher business cycle synchronization
contested.5
Studies detecting a positive effect include Furceri and Karras (2008). They use
a simple pairwise correlation coefficients of GDP and unemployment and find that
all 12 countries in their sample are better synchronized with the common EU-
wide cycle after the start of the EMU. The positive effects of EMU on business
5For a recent survey about business cycle synchronization in Europe, see de Haan et al. (2008).
Willett et al. (2010) provide an overview of the endogeneous OCA theory and its validity for
the first years of the EMU.
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cycle synchronization are confirmed, with albeit different statistical methods, by
Altavilla (2004), Gogas (2013), Darvas and Szapáry (2008), Gonçalves et al. (2009),
among others, as well as for different proxies for economic activity such as industrial
production (Gayer, 2007) or economic sentiment indicators (Aguiar-Conraria et al.,
2013). On the other hand, other studies fail to detect any EMU effect on business
cycle synchronization (Camacho et al., 2006; Weyerstrass et al., 2011), or find even
a dampening one (Papageorgiou et al., 2010).6
Another string of literature suggests rather heterogeneous effects of joining the
EMU across member states. Lehwald (2013) uses a dynamic factor model and
compares the common European factor for the initial EA-12 before and after the
introduction of the EMU. The results suggest that the implementation of the EMU
had a dampening effect for the peripheral economies, defined as Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland, but spurred the co-movement for the core (i.e. the other 8
economies). Along the same lines, Papageorgiou et al. (2010) argue that Europe
tended to converge during the period 1992 - 1999, but to diverge from 2000 - 2009
on, leading to an increasing number of clusters within Europe. Konstantakopoulou
and Tsionas (2011) use a dynamic analysis based on the autoregressive distributed
lag model for the time-span of 1960-2009. Their results point to a core group of
countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, France and Belgium that are
highly synchronized among themselves, while especially Greece and Portugal do
not show any synchronization with the other economies, corroborating the results
of Gouveia and Correia (2008).7
The tumultuous period of the financial crisis and the following sovereign debt
crisis brought deep economic imbalances within the EMU to the limelight (Lane,
2012). However, there are only a very limited number of studies focusing on the
potential (de)synchronization of economic activity during this period. Degiannakis
et al. (2014) investigate the time-varying correlation between the EU-12 and its
initial members using scalar-BEKK, a widely used model of conditional covari-
ances and correlations, and a multivariate riskmetrics framework. While business
6Generally, it is not easy to separate the effects of the introduction of the Euro from other
EU-wide initiatives, as pointed out by Willett et al. (2010).
7However, the core-periphery dualism seems to be less pronounced in Europe than in the United
States, according to the estimates of Ferreira-Lopes and Pina (2011).
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cycles in the EMU were getting increasingly correlated until 2007, the financial
crisis triggered a desynchronization process, most prominently for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain, but also for non-EMU countries such as the United Kingdom
or Sweden, supporting the analysis of Gächter et al. (2012) who find a decrease in
correlation and an increase in the dispersion of synchronization levels due to the
financial crisis within the EMU. Grigoraş and Stanciu (2016) compare concordance
and correlation measures for a sample of European economies, concluding that the
co-movement of economic activity among European economies diverged after the
outbreak of the crisis (starting 2009Q1) compared to the Euro adoption period
(2002Q1 - 2008Q4). Ferroni and Klaus (2015) use a factor model to determine the
business cycle properties of the four largest European economies during the recent
European debt crisis. They find that Germany, France and (surprisingly) Italy are
well-aligned with the EA cycle, whereas Spain shows an asymmetric behaviour.
Differences in the results can be partly explained by the myriad of empirical
methods to determine the level of business cycle synchronization: for instance
coherence and concordance measures based on business cycle dating algorithms
(Harding and Pagan, 2002, 2006; Artis et al., 2004; Grigoraş and Stanciu, 2016),
dynamic factor models (Lee, 2013; Lehwald, 2013; Kose et al., 2003), dynamic
correlations (Croux et al., 2001; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2010), rolling coefficients
(Gayer, 2007), correlation coefficients (Furceri and Karras, 2008) or wavelet anal-
ysis (Aguiar-Conraria and Soares, 2011), among others. For our empirical anal-
ysis, we employ three different methods to analyze whether business cycles have
diverged between the core and the periphery: (i) correlation coefficients as most
prominent measure to assess business cycle synchronization in the literature (Bordo
and Helbling, 2003), (ii) panel regressions that allow for a more systematic repre-
sentation and (iii) nonparametric regressions that are specifically useful to track
non-linear dynamics over time.
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3. Data and Variables
3.1. Data
For our empirical analysis, we use the seasonally adjusted real gross domestic
product (GDP) on a quarterly basis from the OECD. Our dataset includes all
member states of the euro area-12 (EA-12)8 plus Norway, Switzerland, Denmark
and Sweden as non-EMU members, with data ranging from 1970Q1 to 2015Q4.
We focus on gross domestic product as our main indicator for business cycle
movements for two reasons: it is (i) the most comprehensive measure for aggregate
economic activity and (ii) the most widely used and accepted measure in the
academic literature and in the general public (Haan et al., 2008; Grigoraş and
Stanciu, 2016).9
3.2. Calculating Business Cycles
Business cycle refers to the movement of economic activity over time (Burns and
Mitchell, 1946). Generally, two different types of cycles can be distinguished: the
classical and the growth cycle. In the spirit of Lucas (1977), we focus on the
growth cycle, i.e. the evolution of the cyclical component of GDP around its
long-term trend instead of the classical cycle that is focused on the fluctuations of
aggregate economic activity.10 The literature proposes several different methods
to separate the long-term growth trend from the cyclical component (Weyerstrass
et al., 2011). For our study, we employ the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick
8EA-12 includes the eleven countries that adopted the Euro in 1999 (Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) as
well as Greece that joined in 2001.
9Alternatively, other potential measures include industrial production (Imbs, 2010) or the un-
employment rate (Fatas, 1997). On the upside, these indicators are available at higher fre-
quencies. On the downside, they are not as comprehensive a measure for aggregate activity
as GDP, and - in the case of the unemployment rate - depend heavily on country-specific
institutions that make cross-country comparisons difficult.
10From a theoretical point of view, the output gap seems to be the relevant indicator for central
banks to monitor (Gächter and Riedl, 2014). From a technical point, our correlation index,
as explained in further detail in Section 3.3, requires covariance-stationary time-series.
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Figure 1: Business Cycle Fluctuations over time
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Notes: Cyclical component of business cycles, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ=1600.
and Prescott, 1997) to detrend the national real GDP series. Belke and Heine
(2006) show that the HP filter produces cyclical components broadly similar to
those obtained by the bandpass filter. The HP filter is not without criticism,11
but due to its simple estimation and implementation it remains widely used in the
business cycle literature. The cyclical component corresponds to the output gap,
whereas the trend can be interpreted as potential output. We follow the literature
and use a smoothing parameter of λ=1600 for quarterly data (Ravn and Uhlig,
2002). We depict the cyclical movement of the core and peripheral countries in
Figure 1.
11See, for instance, Canova (1998).
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3.3. Correlation Index
In the following, we introduce a correlation index developed by Cerqueira and Mar-
tins (2009) that gains increasing popularity in business cycle research (Gächter and
Riedl, 2014; Bierbaumer-Polly et al., 2016). As opposed to normal correlation coef-
ficients, the correlation index of Cerqueira and Martins (2009) provides a measure
of bilateral correlation for higher - in our case quarterly - frequencies and cap-
tures time-variability in bilateral business cycle correlations since it distinguishes
between specific episodes of higher and lower synchronization, respectively. This
correlation index can be applied to any two covariance-stationary time-series git
and gjt:12
ρijt = 1− 1
2
 git − gi√
1
T
∑T
t=1(git − gi)2
− gjt − gj√
1
T
∑T
t=1(gjt − gj)2
2 (1)
When averaged over time, the correlation index is identical to the conventional
linear correlation coefficient ρij, i.e. ρij= 1T
∑T
t=1 ρijt. However, the index in equa-
tion 1 suffers from an asymmetric range: it is bounded between 3-2T and 1 and
thus more dispersed over negative than over positive values. Cerqueira (2013)
proposes the following transformation
ρnbijt =
1
2
ln
(
1 +
ρijt
2T−3
1− ρijt
)
(2)
which we will use for our subsequent estimations. Another way to examine
the co-movement between country pairs are so-called "rolling window" correlation
coefficients, an approach widely used in the business cycle literature (Weyerstrass
et al., 2011). In contrast to rolling window correlation coefficients, the proposed
correlation index provides distinct advantages: first, there is no loss of observations,
second, there is no need to set a an arbitrary window-length, and, third, it is easier
12Augmented Dickey Fuller tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root process at conventional
significance levels for all series.
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to implement in econometric analysis since rolling-window correlations suffer from
heavy autocorrelation and hence heavily autocorrelated dependent variables.13
4. Empirical Framework and Results
4.1. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients
As a benchmark analysis, we start our empirical investigation with the estima-
tion of simple correlation coefficients which correspond to the average of our (un-
bounded) correlation index ρijt over the same sample period. According to this
measure, national cycles between two countries are synchronized if both are pos-
itively and statistically correlated with each other. In order to analyze time vari-
ation in the synchronization of business cycles, we have divided our data in two
non-overlapping time periods and calculate the correlation coefficient for each time
period separately: the first period starts in 1999Q1 and lasts until 2007Q4, corre-
sponding to the introduction of the Euro until the beginning of the financial crisis
that started in the US, following Bekiros et al. (2015), while the second period
covers the phase after the financial crisis erupted (2008Q1 - 2015Q4). We present
our results in three tables, focusing on (i) individual core countries (Table 1), (ii)
individual periphery countries (Table 2) and (iii) countries outside the EMU (Table
3).
As depicted in Table 1, core countries tend to have quite a high correlation
between each other as well as with the EA-1214 and the periphery aggregate in the
pre-crisis period. The Netherlands and Finland show the lowest correlation with
the periphery and the EA-12, and Austria and Germany the highest, respectively.
The correlation between individual core countries and the periphery starts to drop
after the start of the financial crisis. The drop is most pronounced for Austria and
13For a further discussion, see also Gächter and Riedl (2014) and Degiannakis et al. (2014).
14Naturally, correlation coefficients between EMU member states and the EA-12 are biased
upwards. This bias is more pronounced for countries that have a higher weight in the EA-12
aggregate (Haan et al., 2008).
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France, where the correlation coefficient decreased from 0.934 (Austria) and 0.927
(France) to 0.619 and 0.642.
Table 1: Correlation coefficients: core (individual) vs. periphery (aggregate)
Finland France Germany Austria Netherlands Periphery EA-12
Pre-Crisis
Finland 1
France 0.894*** 1
Germany 0.780*** 0.859*** 1
Austria 0.852*** 0.928*** 0.854*** 1
Netherlands 0.838*** 0.903*** 0.856*** 0.902*** 1
Periphery 0.866*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.934*** 0.864*** 1
EA-12 0.879*** 0.953*** 0.963*** 0.942*** 0.914*** 0.984*** 1
Crisis
Finland 1
France 0.942*** 1
Germany 0.971*** 0.966*** 1
Austria 0.927*** 0.951*** 0.948*** 1
Netherlands 0.872*** 0.771*** 0.827*** 0.793*** 1
Periphery 0.719*** 0.642*** 0.679*** 0.619*** 0.906*** 1
EA-12 0.946*** 0.917*** 0.943*** 0.895*** 0.938*** 0.881*** 1
Notes: The cyclical component is extracted using the HP filter for the logarithmic real and seasonally adjusted
quarterly GDP. The "pre-crisis" period is defined as ranging from 1999Q1 - 2007Q4, the "crisis" period from
2008Q1 - 2015Q4. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
For the periphery (see Table 2), the general correlation between these countries
with the EA-12 and the core seems less pronounced. Italy and Spain show the
highest, Portugal and Greece the lowest correlation with economic activity in the
core and the aggregate EA-12. The peripheral economies decreased their degree
of synchronization with the euro area and the core in the crisis period, with the
exception of Italy, with Spain and Greece showing the most pronounced drop.
In general, Greece seems to have a rather low degree of synchronization with
other European economies, an observation already pointed out by Gayer (2007):
it shows a moderate (positive) but insignificant correlation with the EA-12 but
negative (however insignificant) correlation with core countries in the crisis period.
Interestingly, Italy enjoyed in both sample periods a very strong co-movement of
economic activity with both the core and the EA-12 aggregate.
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients: periphery (individual) vs. core (aggregate)
Italy Portugal Greece Ireland Spain Core EA-12
Pre-Crisis
Italy 1
Portugal 0.603*** 1
Greece 0.544*** 0.261 1
Ireland 0.814*** 0.613*** 0.488*** 1
Spain 0.884*** 0.751*** 0.600*** 0.861*** 1
Core 0.911*** 0.801*** 0.552*** 0.830*** 0.958*** 1
EA-12 0.941*** 0.772*** 0.587*** 0.858*** 0.969*** 0.994*** 1
Crisis
Italy 1
Portugal 0.677*** 1
Greece 0.0615 0.612*** 1
Ireland 0.727*** 0.549*** 0.341* 1
Spain 0.676*** 0.822*** 0.643*** 0.816*** 1
Core 0.917*** 0.416** -0.114 0.658*** 0.502*** 1
EA-12 0.967*** 0.628*** 0.130 0.785*** 0.719*** 0.958*** 1
Notes: The cyclical component is extracted using the HP filter for the logarithmic real and seasonally
adjusted quarterly GDP. The "pre-crisis" period is defined as ranging from 1999Q1 - 2007Q4, the "crisis"
period from 2008Q1 - 2015Q4. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
One way to test whether the membership of the euro area influenced the way
the financial crisis had an impact on business cycle co-movements is to examine
the correlations also for countries that are outside of the EMU but with economies
very much integrated with the euro area. We therefore analyze the correlation
patterns for four non-EMU countries: Denmark, Sweden (EU member countries
who have opted to stay out of the EMU) as well as Switzerland and Norway (as
part of EFTA). Denmark has opted for a fixed exchange rate to the euro and should
thus, from a macroeconomic point of view, be regarded as an "informal" member
of the core. The other three countries have a flexible exchange rate regime (to a
varying degree) with Norway the added specificity of its reliance on oil revenues,
which should make its economy less dependent on the euro area cycle. Results are
depicted in Table 3. In the pre-crisis period, there is no stark difference between
the correlations of the core and the periphery with the non-EMU countries. In both
cases, Switzerland had the highest correlation and Norway the lowest. Yet, the
co-movement patterns changed after the eruption of the financial crisis. Compared
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients: outside EMU countries vs. aggregates
Denmark Sweden Norway Switzerland Periphery Core EA-12
Pre-Crisis
Denmark 1
Sweden 0.903*** 1
Norway 0.692*** 0.732*** 1
Switzerland 0.816*** 0.812*** 0.653*** 1
Periphery 0.831*** 0.893*** 0.680*** 0.929*** 1
Core 0.793*** 0.849*** 0.639*** 0.948*** 0.961*** 1
EA-12 0.818*** 0.878*** 0.667*** 0.951*** 0.984*** 0.994*** 1
Crisis
Denmark 1
Sweden 0.879*** 1
Norway 0.388** 0.201 1
Switzerland 0.867*** 0.734*** 0.448** 1
Periphery 0.736*** 0.773*** 0.278 0.671*** 1
Core 0.926*** 0.899*** 0.379** 0.876*** 0.709*** 1
EA-12 0.921*** 0.917*** 0.368** 0.862*** 0.881*** 0.958*** 1
Notes: The cyclical component is extracted using the HP filter for the logarithmic real and seasonally adjusted
quarterly GDP. The "pre-crisis" period is defined as ranging from 1999Q1 - 2007Q4, the "crisis" period from
2008Q1 - 2015Q4. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
to the pre-crisis period, all non-EMU countries have less synchronization vis-à-vis
the periphery, while correlation with the core stayed more or less at the same level.
Norway seems like an exception since output synchronization fell significantly for
both the core and the periphery. But this might be due to the high variability of
oil prices after 2007/8. All in all it appears that the reaction of these European
economies to the crisis was not visibly affected by their non-membership to the
euro area. The sovereign debt crisis does not seem to have affected the relatively
close correlation between the core countries and these other economies not part of
the euro area. It seems that the relatively strong external position of the non-euro
countries, similar to the one of the core euro countries, was more important than
the fact that they are not part of the EMU.
At the aggregate level, our analysis suggests that correlation between the core
and the periphery fell, as one would expect, after the eruption of the financial
crisis. The non-EMU countries, with their strong external positions, did not expe-
rience risk spreads and showed a lower synchronization with the periphery in the
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crisis period, but no significant change in the output co-movement with the core
countries.
4.2. Panel Regression
In this section, we run variants of the following panel regression to test whether the
eruption of the global financial crisis changed the business cycle synchronization
on a country-pair level:
ρnbijt = β0 + β1Clusterij × Crisist + δi + γj + αij + ωt + ijt (3)
We regress our quarterly correlation index ρnbijt (see equation 2) on an interaction
term between a crisis dummy that equals 1 starting from 2008Q1 and 0 otherwise
and four different country clusters: core, periphery, non-EMU and EA-12. A sta-
tistically significant value for the coefficient β1 in equation 3 indicates a structural
shift in the business cycle synchronization among the specific clusters. We include
all our EA-12 plus four non-EMU countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzer-
land) and run our regressions from the start of the EMU in 1999Q1 until 2015Q4.
Furthermore, we include time, country and bilateral fixed effects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Results are depicted in Table 4 for the core and periphery (i) among and between
themselves (column 1), (ii) vis-à-vis the EA-12 (column 2) and (iii) relative to
the non-EMU countries (column 3), defined as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and
Switzerland. Note that we do not include dummies for the crisis and the clusters
since they are absorbed by the time and country-pair fixed effects.
Our estimations support our initial findings based on correlation coefficients: the
negative interaction coefficient suggests that countries along the core-periphery di-
mension were less aligned after the eruption of the financial crisis (column 1). This
effect is significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, while core countries were growing
stronger together as a group, peripheral countries were drifting apart. As a result,
the core countries grew stronger together as a block among themselves, the pe-
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Table 4: Business cycle synchronization
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis × Core - Core 0.205**
(0.0880)
Crisis × Per. - Per. -0.252***
(0.0880)
Crisis × Core - Per. -0.535***
(0.0604)
Crisis × Core - EA-12 -0.00694
(0.0516)
Crisis × Per. - EA-12 -0.405***
(0.0516)
Crisis × Core - non-EMU 0.181***
(0.0657)
Crisis × Per. - non-EMU -0.204***
(0.0657)
Observations 8159 8159 8159
R2 0.159 0.156 0.151
Time FE X X X
Country FE X X X
Bilateral FE X X X
Sample Mean ρnb 1.320 1.320 1.320
Notes: Dependent variable is the unbounded quarterly bilateral correlation in-
dex by Cerqueira (2013). Clustered standard errors at the country-pair level in
parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Specifica-
tions (1) - (3) include country, bilateral and time (quarterly) fixed effects. The
dummy variable "crisis" equals 1 starting from 2008Q1.
ripheral countries as cluster were less aligned relative to the core, but also relative
to themselves. Comparing the core and peripheral countries with country-pairs
belonging to the EA-12, a similar picture emerges (column 2). Peripheral coun-
tries were significantly less aligned with EA-12 countries during the crisis period,
whereas core countries did not have a statistically significant change in the syn-
chronization of economic output. A drop in synchronization is also detected for
non-EMU countries with regards to the periphery, which stands in contrast with
the increased alignment of the non-EMU countries with the core (column 3). Judg-
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ing from these results, the period after 2007 initiated a decoupling in the Eurozone,
and resulted in a group of core countries that over time increased their synchro-
nization of economic activity, both among themselves and towards neighboring
countries that are not part of the euro area. On the other side, the peripheral
countries decoupled from the core, non-EMU countries and among themselves.
Concerning the "decoupling" within the periphery, all these countries had peri-
ods of high risk premia in common. But the root cause of their difficulties was very
different: Ireland and Spain had a real estate boom which burst with the financial
crisis. But the economies of these two countries started to recover quickly once
the banking problems in the real estate sector had been resolved. Portugal and
Greece, by contrast, had more fundamental problems of growth and productivity
and have not fully recovered even today.
4.3. Local Polynomial Regressions
Both our correlation coefficients and our panel regression point to a split between
the synchronization of peripheral and core business cycles after the eruption of the
financial crisis. However, our results may hide some important variability given our
time aggregation in two non-overlapping periods. Generally, linear models provide
a simple fit to the data, are easy to understand and widely used. However, they are
less suited if the data shows nonlinearities. In our case, business cycle synchroniza-
tion across different country groups is likely to fluctuate over time. Nonparametric
methods provide a useful modeling alternative since they are widely used in data
analysis to determine unknown trends and do not rely on any specific functional
form.15 We estimate the following model to analyze cross-country business cycle
synchronization over time:
ρnbijt = f(t) + uijt (4)
15For an in-depth treatment, see Fan and Gijbels (1996), especially Chapter 3.
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Since f(t) is unknown, we use local polynomial regressions as a smoothing ap-
proach that makes no assumptions about the functional form of f(t). This ap-
proach models the regression locally in the neighborhood around each point of
interest t0 with a window width of h, using a p-order Taylor expansion as ap-
proximation of the true function. In the estimation process, a weighting function
K (Kernel) determines how observations in the neighborhood of t0 are weighted.
The quality of the fit of the LPR is affected by these three critical parameters.
For our estimations, we use an Epanechnikov kernel, a polynomial of order 1 and
rely on a rule-of-thumb (ROT) algorithm to automatically determine the optimal
bandwidth, following closely the setting of Cerqueira (2013). We present our LPR
results with pointwise confidence intervals (95%) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Contrary to our analysis based on correlation coefficients and panel data, we take
advantage of the full length of our sample starting in 1970 in order to track changes
of synchronization over an extended time horizon, even though our primary interest
remains on potential changes in the recent crisis period.
Results for the core and periphery cluster are depicted in Figure 2. Synchroniza-
tion between core and peripheral countries was rather low during the 1970s until
the beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 2a). During the run-up to the EMU, cy-
cles seemed to synchronize rather sharply, in line with other studies that mention
the "Maastricht effect" (Papageorgiou et al., 2010; Inklaar et al., 2008; Aguiar-
Conraria and Soares, 2011). After the establishment of the currency area, the
output co-movements continued to oscillate on a rather high level in the early
2000s. The process of higher synchronization between the two clusters has come
to a hold shortly before the beginning of the financial crisis and consequently be-
fore the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, thus corroborating the findings of
Ferroni and Klaus (2015) in the case of Spain. Our findings are also in line with
Degiannakis et al. (2014) who suggest a general reduction in the co-movement of
economic output among peripheral economies and the EMU-12 cycle after 2007.16
16As local polynomial regressions take data before and after t0 into account, our results anticipate
to a certain extent future changes in synchronization. Therefore, as opposed to assigning a
certain level of synchronization to a certain date, the LPR results are best interpreted as
overall tendencies over a period of time.
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Synchronization starts to slightly increase again after 2010, but remains at a low
level.17
Figure 2: Local polynomial regressions: core and periphery
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Notes: Local polynomial regressions for core and peripheral countries.
Starting from the mid-1970s, peripheral countries steadily increased synchro-
nization among themselves that peaked around the mid-1990s (see Figure 2b).
17 In order to check whether our slope is different from a constant, we implement a significance
test that is analogous to a simple t-test in a parametric regression setting (Racine, 1997;
Racine et al., 2006). For all the nonparametric models presented in this section, the test
rejects the notion that our explanatory variable exerts a constant effect at a 1% significance
level, i.e. the synchronization between the clusters varies significantly over time.
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From there on, the alignment of economic activity hovered around a steady level,
which on average was however lower than for the core countries. The co-movement
of output decreased among peripheral economics during the financial crisis. How-
ever, synchronization started to increase from 2010 on, potentially reflecting the
subsequent symmetric impact of the sovereign debt crisis on economic activity.
The relationship among core countries shows a slow, but steady upwards trend
since the 1990s (see Figure 2c). The first plateau is reached after the rather strong
increase in synchronization after the German unification process, and then in the
early years of the EMU. Rather interestingly, and opposed to the behaviour of
peripheral countries, there seems to exist no real dampening impact of either the
financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis on the alignment of economic activity
among core countries. Rather to the contrary, economic synchronization has had
a slight upwards tick in the period after 2010.
Figure 3 shows the development between the core and periphery vis-à-vis coun-
tries outside of the EMU. These economies enjoyed a rather low level of synchro-
nization with all the EA-12 countries up until 1990, but then gradually increased
to synchronize up until the mid-2000 (Figure 3a). The onset of the financial crisis
triggered a rapid decrease in correlation, corroborating the results of Degiannakis
et al. (2014) that non-EMU countries decoupled from the EMU-cycle in 2007.
However, the synchronization of economic activity between non-EMU and EA-12
countries started to increase again around 2010. Splitting the EA-12 sample in the
periphery (Figure 3b) and core clusters (Figure 3c), it becomes obvious that the
most recent slowdown in synchronization is particularly driven by the periphery.
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Figure 3: Local polynomial regressions: non-EMU countries
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Notes: Local polynomial regressions for non-EMU countries relative to core, peripheral and EA-12 countries.
Overall, our dynamic analysis relying on local polynomial regressions confirms
our previous results. Core and peripheral countries uncoupled significantly in the
wake of the financial crisis. It also confirms that core countries seem to enjoy a
higher (albeit on a very low level) synchronization after the crisis. Turning to the
correlation among countries of the periphery, the financial crisis led first to asym-
metric behavior, but turned into more synchronization due to a common shock in
form of the sovereign debt crisis. Economic activity with non-EMU countries was
particularly uncoupled for peripheral countries around the financial crisis, but less
so for the core.
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Figure 4: Local polynomial regressions: robustness check
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Notes: Local polynomial regression between core and peripheral countries without Italy and Greece,
respectively.
As a robustness check, we provide our local polynomial regression estimations
with a different set of countries for the periphery cluster. Our analysis in Section
4.1 suggests that both Greece and Italy are potential outliers, with the former
having the lowest and the latter the strongest correlation with core countries.
As pointed out by Campos and Macchiarelli (2016), the periphery pattern that
emerged after the introduction of the Euro included Spain, Portugal, Ireland and
Greece, but excluded Italy. Other studies, as Lehwald (2013), do not include Italy
in their definition of peripheral countries either. Greece, on the other hand, seemed
to have rather different output co-movements compared with the rest of the euro
area (Gayer, 2007).
Thus, we repeat our local polynomial regressions with the same set of core
countries, but exclude consecutively either Italy or Greece in the group of periph-
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eral countries. Results from this exercise are depicted in Figure 4. Compared to
the solid line, which represents our initial core-periphery country grouping, the
group without Greece is actually more synchronized with the core, pointing to the
particular decoupling of the Greek economy with the core countries, which was
already taking place shortly after the introduction of the Euro. Our estimations
support the findings of Gouveia and Correia (2008) who point out that the output
co-movements of Greece were becoming weaker after 1997. If we exclude Italy
from the periphery cluster, the desynchronization of the periphery with regards
to the core is even more pronounced, suggesting that Italy enjoys on average a
higher synchronization with the core than other peripheral countries. Our find-
ings thus support the analysis of Campos and Macchiarelli (2016) who find that
Italy may not be directly regarded as peripheral country from a business cycle
synchronization point of view.
4.4. Amplitude vs Co-Movement
Most of the literature has focused on co-movements in the cycle as a measure of
synchronization. But this can be misleading if the amplitudes of the cycle are
very different. Figure 5 illustrates this with an example: there are two countries,
which share the same (highly stylized) business cycle, but the amplitudes are very
different. This has two implications: the correlation coefficient between the two
series is 1, but at the peak and through of the cycle large differences appear. These
differences can lead to similar problems of common policy making as if the two
cycles were uncorrelated. But the problems posed by different amplitudes appear
mostly around the extremes of the cycle. The widespread feeling during the peak
of the crisis that the ECB’s policy did not fit the needs of any country18 could
thus have two origins: either the correlation pattern changed since the financial
crisis or the amplitudes of the cycles were different across countries so that one
would expect at any peak and bottom of the cycle similar problems in business
cycle positions. Moreover, differences in the amplitude could magnify the impact
of any desynchronization.
18For a theoretical analysis, see Gros and Hefeker (2002).
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Figure 5: Perfect co-movement but different amplitude
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Notes: This figure shows stylized business cycles for country A and B. The business cycles are synchronous, with
country B having an amplitude which is twice as large as country A’s.
These considerations suggest that the emphasis on correlations makes sense only
if countries have cycles which might be shifted, but have a similar amplitude (and
length). Figure 6 depicts the case of two countries whose cycles are shifted over
time in such a way that the correlation is equal to zero. In this case the differences
in the cyclical positions are minimal at half cycle and remain constant between
the peak and trough.
Different amplitudes exacerbate any lack of correlation as shown in Figure 7
which shows three lines: the common euro area cycle, the cycle of a country
which is delayed by half a cycle, but has the same amplitude as the common
cycle, and a country with an amplitude twice as large as the common cycle. It
is apparent that the difference between the national and the euro area cycle is
not the same when the amplitude changes although the correlation coefficient
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Figure 6: Zero correlation because of phase shift
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Notes: This figure shows stylized business cycles for country A and C with the same amplitude but that are
uncorrelated.
between the national and the euro area cycle is equal (to zero) in both cases.
At the bottom of the last crisis it had been observed that the ECB policy was
"one-size-fits-none" as the ECB’s policy appeared too loose for the core and too
tight for the periphery. A comparison between these figures suggests one way one
could discriminate between the two hypotheses: if differences in amplitudes are
the problem one would expect large divergences to appear mainly at the peak and
trough of the cycle. By contrast, if business cycles are shifted, the divergences in
cyclical positions should persist most of the time. The way the policy discussion
has evolved suggests that different amplitudes might have been a key factor since
differences in cyclical positions play much less of a role today than at the peak of
the crisis.
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Figure 7: Correlation and phase shift
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Notes: This figure shows the business cycle of the euro area, country A which is shifted and country B which is
shifted and has an amplitude twice as large as country A’s.
A first measure of different amplitudes is the volatility of business cycles, at
the national level, proxied by the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of national real GDP series. A first question is thus whether there has been con-
vergence in the amplitude of business cycles measured by their overall volatility
(Gayer, 2007). As before, we rely on the HP filter for the trend-cycle decomposi-
tion.
As in previous sections, we are interested in the effects of the potential changes
since the start of the financial crisis. Thus, we split the sample between the early
phase of the Euro (1999Q1-2007Q4) and the crisis period (2008Q1-2015Q4), but
also provide the standard deviation for the whole period from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4.
The results are depicted in Table 5.
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Table 5: Amplitude of business cycles
1999Q1-2015Q4 1999Q1-2007Q4 2008Q1-2015Q4
Aggregate
Periphery 1.32 1.12 1.52
Core 1.39 1.24 1.53
EA-12 1.29 1.18 1.40
Periphery
Greece 2.47 1.47 3.27
Italy 1.39 1.17 1.60
Spain 1.40 1.07 1.70
Ireland 2.56 2.49 2.50
Portugal 1.43 1.24 1.63
Core
Finland 2.11 1.76 2.43
France 1.03 0.95 1.07
Germany 1.70 1.48 1.92
Austria 1.34 1.20 1.47
Netherlands 1.46 1.52 1.40
Outside EMU
Norway 1.12 1.19 1.04
Sweden 1.83 1.50 2.09
Denmark 1.52 1.50 1.50
Switzerland 1.27 1.42 1.10
Notes: Standard deviations of output gap in %.
Focusing on the development of volatility in the periods after the introduction of
the Euro and before the crisis (column 2), Ireland and Greece exhibit the highest
business cycle volatility in the periphery, which is also above the average of the
(aggregate) EA-12. Among the core countries, Finland, the Netherlands and sur-
prisingly Germany stand out, whereas France shows the lowest variation. In the
period after 2007Q4, the volatility of national business cycles was generally on the
rise for all peripheral and core countries, except for the Netherlands. Yet, Greece
and Ireland had the highest volatility, closely followed by Finland. While the varia-
tion across countries is rather pronounced, it does not run along the core-periphery
dimension.
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For the functioning of the euro area, the more relevant question is whether
national cycles of individual countries had a different reactivity to the aggregate
EA-12 cycle, i.e whether different countries had different "betas". To measure
these "betas", we run the following simple regression with heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors in the spirit of Gogas (2013) and
De Grauwe and Ji (2016):
ln(cit) = β0 + β1 × ln(cEA−12t ) + et (5)
This is done for our core and peripheral countries individually with a sample
running from 1999Q1-2015Q4, with cit being the cyclical component of GDP for
each country i and cEA−12t for the EA-12, respectively. Results for the core and
the periphery are shown in Table 6 and 7.19
Table 6: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: periphery
Greece Italy Spain Ireland Portugal
EA-12 0.477 1.031*** 0.873*** 1.627*** 0.758***
(0.477) (0.0528) (0.150) (0.192) (0.141)
R2 0.062 0.912 0.650 0.670 0.472
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of
each peripheral country. Sample from 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. HAC standard errors
in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 7: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: core
Finland France Germany Austria Netherlands
EA-12 1.499*** 0.741*** 1.254*** 0.949*** 1.038***
(0.127) (0.0556) (0.0879) (0.0547) (0.0969)
R2 0.843 0.868 0.904 0.840 0.841
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each
core country. Sample from 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. HAC standard errors in parenthesis.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
19As a robustness check, we exclude for all regressions the reference country i from the EA-
12 aggregate to minimize simultaneity issues. This bias should be negligible for smaller
economies, but more relevant for bigger countries like France or Germany. The results do not
vary significantly, and are reported in the Appendix.
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The results suggest that all national cycles are tightly linked to the euro area
one (with one exception, Greece). There is no distinct core-periphery pattern,
except for the special case of Greece. Compared to the other nine countries that
react positively to a reaction of the aggregate cycle, the coefficient for Greece is
not only lower in absolute magnitude, but also statistically not significant.
Within the core there is a large, statistically significant difference between Ger-
many and France: Germany’s beta is at 1.25 almost twice as large as that of France
(0.74). This means that if the common cycle shows an output gap of 2 %, that
of France (compared to its own cycle) would be 1.48 %, whereas that of Germany
would be 2.5 %. Any large common up- or downswing could thus lead to very
large cyclical positions. Within the periphery one finds similar pronounced differ-
ences, with Ireland having a beta of 1.63, compared to 0.87 for Spain. Italy is the
only large country with a beta almost exactly equal to one. From the non-EMU
countries, Norway seems to react the least to the aggregate EA-12 cycle, having
both the lowest coefficient and R2, as depicted in Table 8.
Table 8: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: outside EMU
Sweden Denmark Norway Switzerland
EA-12 1.276*** 1.023*** 0.454*** 0.877***
(0.133) (0.0786) (0.114) (0.0869)
R2 0.807 0.757 0.274 0.789
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical com-
ponent of each core country. Sample from 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. HAC
standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
To investigate whether our relationship between the national and the aggregate
cycle changed after the eruption of the financial crisis, we include a dummy variable
into our empirical setting which takes the value one for the period after 2007Q4 and
zero otherwise. The interaction term between this crisis dummy and the EA-12
cyclical component indicates whether there was a trend shift, as shown in equation
6:
ln(cit) = β0 + β1ln(c
EA−12
t ) + β2Dcrisis + β3ln(c
EA−12
t )×Dcrisis + et (6)
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The results are depicted in Table A.3, A.4, A.5 in the Appendix. Greece is
again different, with much of the idiosyncratic movement compared to the EA-12
cycle taking place after 2007Q4. Yet the coefficient remains the lowest of all the
peripheral countries. In general, our results support the notion that there is not
a striking difference between core and peripheral countries in their reaction to the
common EA-12 cycle.20 However, the goodness of fit for the core regressions as
shown by the R2 is, with the exception of Italy, always lower for the periphery
than for the core countries. These findings are broadly in line with Gogas (2013),
but at odds with De Grauwe and Ji (2016).
Figure 8: Beta vs. standard deviation
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Notes: The scatter plots show the standard deviation of the output gap from Table 5 against the "beta" from
regressions in Table 6, 7, 8 (period 1999Q1 - 2015Q4) and Table A.3, A.4, A.5 in the Appendix for the period
from 1999Q1-2007Q4 and from 2008Q1-2015Q4.
20As before, we provide a benchmark analysis that excludes the reference country in the EA-12
series. The results do not vary significantly, see Table A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix.
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The large differences in the elasticity with which different countries react to
the common euro area cycle begs the question whether these differences can also
explain the large differences in the amplitude of national cycles discussed earlier.
Figure 8 therefore shows a scatter diagram of the standard deviations in Table 5
against the beta coefficients reported in Tables 7, 6, 8 for the period from 1999Q1-
2015Q1 and Tables A.3, A.4, A.5 in the Appendix for the period from 1999Q1-
2007Q4 and from 2008Q1-2015Q4.
There is a rather close correlation between the standard deviation of the national
business cycles and the degree to which the national cycle reacts to the common
one. The exception is, again, Greece, whose economy seems to have followed a
completely different pattern since the outbreak of the crisis. The close correlation
between the estimated beta coefficients and the standard deviation of national
cycles suggests that the much higher variability observed in some countries was
not due to specific policy errors, but to the structure of the economies and their
financial sectors.
5. Conclusion
Business cycle (de)synchronization plays a pivotal role for monetary policy in a
currency union. When business cycle conditions diverge strongly, the stance of the
ECB, which has to look only at the average, might not fit any country.
We provide evidence for the (de)synchronization of two distinct clusters within
the EMU: the core and the periphery. Correlation coefficients indicate that the
synchronization of economic activity between these country clusters fell markedly
in the period after the start of the financial crisis (2008Q1-2015Q4) compared to
the pre-crisis period (1999Q1-2007Q4). Panel and local polynomial regressions
based on a quarterly correlation index by Cerqueira (2013) confirm that periph-
eral countries became less aligned relative to both the core countries and other
economies outside of the EMU in the crisis period. Furthermore, the peripheral
countries became also less aligned among themselves, in contrast to the cluster of
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core countries that did not show any change synchronization between the pre- and
the crisis period.
We also find that it is not sufficient to look at correlation patterns if one looks
for a potential for desynchronization of business cycles. Countries which share the
same business cycle might nevertheless experience quite different cyclical positions,
and thus require a different monetary policy stance if the amplitude of the cycle
is very different. We find indeed large differences in the amplitude of national
cycles and the degree to which the national cycle reacts to the common one. A
first conclusion is thus that monetary policy making in the euro area faces two
problems: the financial crisis led to a desynchronization of the cycle as only the
periphery was affected by high risk premia for its sovereign and the private sector.
Moreover, individual countries have cycles of different amplitudes, which implies
that even countries which share a common cycle might require a different monetary
policy stance.
A high degree of correlation is thus not the only condition to ensure "one-size-
fits-all". Similarity in the amplitudes of national cycles constitutes another. Cycles
have diverged between the core and the periphery (and within the periphery) since
the financial crisis. It remains to be seen to what extent this represents a temporary
phenomenon. If it was due to the high risk premia during the peak of the crisis, this
desynchronization might have been only temporary. It seems that at any rate, the
large changes in correlations after the crisis have caused most research to focus on
this phenomenon, neglecting the second issue, namely different amplitudes, which
can also lead to problems for the common monetary policy.
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A. Appendix
Table A.1: Contemporaneous effect of EA-11 cycle on national cycle: periphery
gre ita spa ire por
EA-11 0.377 1.009*** 0.794*** 1.621*** 0.738***
(0.481) (0.0626) (0.156) (0.197) (0.139)
R2 0.040 0.868 0.561 0.651 0.452
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component
of each peripheral country against the EA-12 cycle excluding the reference
country. Sample from 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. HAC standard errors in parenthesis.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.2: Contemporaneous effect of EA-11 cycle on national cycle: core
Finland France Germany Austria Netherlands
EA-11 1.505*** 0.675*** 1.270*** 0.942*** 1.026***
(0.133) (0.0632) (0.158) (0.0574) (0.102)
R2 0.835 0.818 0.782 0.831 0.819
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each
core country, independent variable is the EA-12 cycle excluding the reference country.
Sample from 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. HAC standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.3: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: periphery
Greece Italy Spain Ireland Portugal
EA-12 0.734** 0.936*** 0.883*** 1.819*** 0.812***
(0.342) (0.0625) (0.0627) (0.165) (0.134)
Crisis 0.00341 -0.000244 0.000687 -0.00699 0.00139
(0.0120) (0.00181) (0.00407) (0.00505) (0.00490)
Crisis × EA-12 -0.429 0.169** -0.0113 -0.418 -0.0827
(0.725) (0.0847) (0.239) (0.299) (0.228)
R2 0.078 0.918 0.651 0.701 0.475
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each peripheral
country against the EA-12 with a sample from in 1990Q1 and ends in 2015Q4. The crisis
dummy covers the period from "2008Q1 - 2015Q4". HAC standard errors in parenthesis.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.4: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: core
Finland France Germany Austria Netherlands
EA-12 1.317*** 0.773*** 1.215*** 0.964*** 1.183***
(0.169) (0.0736) (0.0764) (0.0504) (0.142)
Crisis -0.000346 -0.00190 0.000859 0.000244 0.00163
(0.00302) (0.00171) (0.00249) (0.00214) (0.00238)
Crisis × EA-12 0.325 -0.0765 0.0787 -0.0242 -0.246
(0.223) (0.102) (0.152) (0.113) (0.164)
R2 0.853 0.879 0.906 0.840 0.855
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each core country
against the EA-12 cycle with a sample from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4. The crisis dummy covers the period
from "2008Q1 - 2015Q4". HAC standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.5: Contemporaneous effect of EA-12 cycle on national cycle: outside EMU
Sweden Denmark Norway Switzerland
EA-12 1.119*** 1.046*** 0.674*** 1.151***
(0.137) (0.144) (0.190) (0.119)
Crisis -0.00393 -0.00186 -0.000271 0.00212
(0.00325) (0.00303) (0.00329) (0.00213)
Crisis × EA-12 0.244 -0.0598 -0.400** -0.474**
(0.263) (0.171) (0.190) (0.192)
R2 0.825 0.762 0.326 0.849
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each
non-EMU country against the EA-12 cycle with a sample from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4.
The crisis dummy covers the period from "2008Q1 - 2015Q4". HAC standard errors
in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.6: Contemporaneous effect of EA-11 cycle on national cycle: periphery
Greece Italy Spain Ireland Portugal
EA-11 0.698* 0.891*** 0.863*** 1.824*** 0.797***
(0.350) (0.0690) (0.0700) (0.174) (0.135)
Crisis 0.00320 -0.000408 0.000630 -0.00725 0.00136
(0.0121) (0.00219) (0.00460) (0.00519) (0.00499)
Crisis × EA-11 -0.541 0.216** -0.117 -0.436 -0.0923
(0.713) (0.100) (0.223) (0.303) (0.225)
R2 0.063 0.877 0.565 0.684 0.456
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each peripheral
country against the EA-12 cycle excluding the respective country. The crisis dummy covers
the period from "2008Q1 - 2015Q4". HAC standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.7: Contemporaneous effect of EA-11 cycle on national cycle: core
Finland France Germany Austria Netherlands
EA-11 1.315*** 0.716*** 1.245*** 0.959*** 1.177***
(0.175) (0.0778) (0.124) (0.0520) (0.156)
Crisis -0.000382 -0.00229 0.000918 0.000233 0.00167
(0.00309) (0.00199) (0.00374) (0.00221) (0.00258)
Crisis × EA-11 0.340 -0.0918 0.0562 -0.0284 -0.253
(0.231) (0.117) (0.287) (0.118) (0.178)
R2 0.845 0.835 0.783 0.831 0.833
Notes: Dependent variable is the quarterly (HP filtered) cyclical component of each core country
against the EA-11 cycle excluding the respective country. The crisis dummy covers the period from
"2008Q1 - 2015Q4". HAC standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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